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1Abstract
There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative
performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar
year to their performance in the early part of the year. However, emphasis was put on re-
turns in excess of some exogenous benchmark return. In this paper, we investigate whether
fund managers have ranking objectives (as in a tournament). First, in a two-period model,
we analyze the game played by two risk-neutral fund managers with ranking objectives.
We derive conditions on the set of possible strategies under which the aggregate amount
of risk undertaken in the late period is larger than in the ¯rst period. In the second part
of the paper, we provide evidence that (i) funds have risk incentives generated by ranking
objectives, (ii) risk induced by ranking objectives is mainly idiosyncratic, and (iii) risk
incentives generated by ranking objectives are stronger for funds ranked in the top decile
after the ¯rst part of the year.
Keywords: ranking-based objectives, interim performance, risk-taking incentives.
JEL Classi¯cation: G11, G24.
21 Introduction
There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative perfor-
mance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year
to their performance in the early part of the year (see Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996),
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Kosky and Ponti® (1999), and Chen and Pennachi (1999)).
A particular feature of these studies is the assumption that managers are evaluated against
some index return.1 However, information presented to the crowd often refers to rankings
as a measure of relative performance. For example, in the Managed and Personal Investing
section of the Wall Street Journal Europe, the Fund Scorecard provides the return of the
top ¯fteen performers in a category. The importance of ranking is also illustrated by Gould
(1998):
\Bartlett Europe has returned an annual average of 27:2 percent for the three years
through Dec. 4, ranking ¯rst among the 46 European stock funds tracked by Moningstar Inc.,
the ¯nancial publisher. The average return of the category was 18:7 percent, Morningstar
said."
Furthermore, empirical studies also suggest that ranking is a measure of relative perfor-
mance investors take into account (see Massa (1997)). Therefore, since managers receive
asset-based compensation (see Khorana (1996)) and investors take ranking into account
when choosing funds2, it generates ranking-based objectives for managers.
The goal of this paper is to investigate how ranking objectives in°uence managers'
investment strategies, and test empirically whether managers respond to ranking objectives.
To study the in°uence of ranking objectives on investment strategies, we develop a model
in which, during two investment periods, two risk-neutral managers compete for funds to
manage in the future and observe their interim relative performance. We show that in
the ¯rst period, managers maximize their expected return while in the second period, the
1Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Chen and Pennachi (1999) take an exogenous market return index, Kosky
and Ponti® (1999) take the average return in the considered category while Brown, Harlow and Stark (1996) use
the median return.
2Other evidence that investors' choice of funds is positively correlated to funds' past performances includes
Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tu®ano (1993), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Lettau (1997).
3riskiness of the investment strategy chosen by managers depends on their ranking, the
interim loser taking more risk than the interim winner. This results holds even if managers'
compensation depends also on their performance relative to some market return. We also
derive conditions on the set of possible strategies under which the aggregate amount of risk
undertaken in the second period is larger than in the ¯rst period.
A direct consequence of this last result is that if managers have ranking based objectives
then the aggregate amount of risk undertaken by two funds well ahead of the market after
the ¯rst period may increase in the second period.
The risk-taking incentives generated by ranking objectives are di®erent from risk-taking
incentives generated by excess return (i.e., returns in excess of the market return) objec-
tives. If funds are evaluated with respect to the market return, the benchmark is exogenous.
Conversely, if ranking matters, then the benchmark against which a fund is evaluated is en-
dogenous. How much money a fund attracts depends on the performance of its competitors.
Therefore, portfolio selection is the outcome of a game played between funds.
In the second part of the paper, we test empirically whether fund managers have ranking
objectives. To perform such a test, we construct an interim performance measure which
captures both the interim ranking and the distance to the top fund. For any fund (not
ranked ¯rst at interim stage), the larger this performance measure, the better the ranking
and/or the smaller the distance to the top fund. If managers have ranking objectives, the
better their interim performance, the higher their incentive to participate in a winner-takes-
all contest, hence the larger their risk-taking incentives. We ¯nd evidence of signi¯cant
positive relation between the interim performance measure and the change of risk in the
last part of the year for funds ranked in the top half. Moreover, this relation is signi¯cantly
stronger for funds in the top decile than for other top half funds. These results suggest that
a top interim performance (i.e., belonging to the top decile) generates strong incentives to
take risk in order to end the year ranked ¯rst.
One could argue that there is an alternative explanation for our results: the allocation
of money into funds is convex in excess return (i.e., return in excess of the chosen bench-
mark), hence generating a compensation convex in performance and risk-taking incentives
for managers. We test for such a possibility. As Chevalier and Ellison (1997), we choose a
4market return (here, the S&P500 index) as a benchmark. As in the other studies, we ¯nd
that funds ahead of the benchmark decrease risk in the last part of the year. But we do not
¯nd any evidence that the sensitivity of change in risk to excess return is di®erent for funds
well ahead the market and for funds slightly ahead of the market. In other words, we do
not ¯nd any evidence that risk-taking incentives are generated by compensations convex in
excess return.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 derives the equilibrium when mangers have ranking-
based objectives. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
A growing body of literature studies the mutual fund tournament both theoretically and
empirically.
On the empirical side, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997)
and Kosky and Ponti® (1999) provide evidence that the mutual fund tournament generates
incentives for managers not to act in the interest of investors. Assuming that managers
are evaluated on a calendar year basis, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) provide evidence
that mid-year "losers" increase fund volatility in the latter part of the year relative to
mid-year "winners". Chevalier and Ellison (1997) study how relative performance after
three quarters of the year in°uence investment strategy in the last quarter. Considering
two-year-old funds, they show that funds that are somewhat behind the market increase
risk to a greater extent than funds that are ahead of the market. Kosky and Ponti® (1999)
focus on the use of derivatives by mutual funds. They show that changes in risk are less
severe for funds that use derivatives.
These studies assume that changes in risk in the last part of the year depend on the
di®erence between the realized return and a benchmark return over the ¯rst part of the
year. Therefore, these studies di®erentiate the behavior of funds ahead of the benchmark
from those behind the benchmark after the ¯rst part of the year. Our goal is di®erent,
5we want to test whether funds have ranking objectives. More precisely, we want to test
whether some funds engage in a winner-takes-all contest toward the end of year.
Closely related theoretical papers studying relative performance evaluation in ¯nancial
markets are those of Huddart (1999), Hvide (1999), and Palomino (1999) who consider
a game played by several fund managers. In this respect, our model is di®erent from
those which analyzes the behavior of a manager evaluated against an exogenous benchmark
(see, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Admati and P°eiderer (1996), Chen and
Pennachi (1999)).
Hvide (1999) and Palomino (1999) study the consequences of relative performance ob-
jective in the context of a single investment decision. Hvide shows that in a situation with
moral hazard on both e®ort and risk, standard tournament rewards induce excessive risk
and lack of e®ort. Palomino assumes that managers with di®erent levels of information
compete in oligopolistic markets and aim at maximizing their relative performance against
the average performance in their category. He shows that despite the objective function
being linear in performances, managers have incentives to choose overly-risky strategies.
Huddart (1999) considers a two-period model in which interim performances are observ-
able. He shows that asset-based compensation schemes generate incentives for managers to
invest in overly-risky portfolio in the ¯rst period, and that performance fees align managers'
incentives with those of investors.
Das and Sundaram (1998) study another aspect of the competition in the mutual fund
industry: the fee structure. They consider a model in which fund managers use fee struc-
tures to signal their higher ability. They provide conditions under which investors are better
o® under an incentive fee regime than under a \fulcrum" fee regime.
Our results should be compared with those of Cabral (1997) on the choice of R&D
projects. Cabral considers an in¯nite-period race between two ¯rms that choose between
low variance projects (low gains with high probability) and high variance projects (large
gains with low probability). If the two ¯rms choose a project of the same type then outcomes
are perfectly correlated. Cabral shows that in equilibrium, both ¯rms choose overly risky
R&D strategies. There are four main di®erences between Cabral's model and ours. First,
in Cabral's model, players have an in¯nite horizon. It follows that strategy choices are not
6in°uenced by an \end of the game" e®ect. Second, players receive a payo® in every period.
This is equivalent to assuming observable interim performance in our context. Conversely, in
our model, players face an end of the game and only receive a payo® at the end of the game.
Third, we do not assume a perfect correlation of returns if the two managers undertake the
same level of risk. Hence, in our model, managers face a trade-o® between expected return
and variance while in Cabral's model, agents face a trade-o® between expected return and
co-variance. Last, in Cabral's R&D race, projects' payo®s are di®erent only in case of
success. If projects fail, the costs faced by ¯rms are independent of the projects chosen.
This implies that an intermediate loser only catches up with the leader if a good outcome is
realized. The situation is di®erent in the mutual fund tournament. An intermediate loser
has two ways of catching up with the winner: by winning more in case of good outcomes
or by losing less is case of bad outcomes.
The consequences of dynamic incentives and relative performance evaluation have also
been studied by Meyer and Vickers (1997). They show that in a dynamic principal-agent
relationship, relative performance evaluation can be either welfare increasing or decreasing.
The reason is that in a dynamic setting, there may be both explicit and implicit incentives
and better information may decrease implicit incentives. Our model is di®erent from that
of Meyer and Vickers in two ways. First, in their model, intermediate performance is
observable. In our context, if investors observe fund performances at the end of the ¯rst
period, then managers always act in the interest of investors. Second, in our model, portfolio
decisions are costless, i.e., they do not require any e®ort from fund managers. This is
di®erent from standard principal-agent models in which agents' output results from an
costly e®ort.
3 Presentation of the model
There are two periods, 1 and 2, and two risk-neutral money managers. In each period,
managers have one unit of money to invest.3 There is a continuum of investment strategies
3A more realistic model would assume that in period 1 a manager has one unit to invest, and for a realized
return R1 in period 1, the manager invests an amount R1 in period 2. We have assumed the constant investment
7and the return of each strategy is normally distributed. Strategies di®er in their expected
return and variance, however, the expected return of a strategy is a function m(:) of the
variance v of the strategy. Hence, the return of a strategy is normally distributed with mean
m(v) and variance v. The function m(:) is assumed to be positive, twice di®erentiable,
strictly concave and has a maximum at ^ m = m(^ v) with ^ v strictly positive.
A possible interpretation for the shape of m(:) is that there is no borrowing constraint
but borrowing is increasingly costly. Therefore, there is a borrowing treshold beyond which
the marginal borrowing cost exceeds the marginal expected return of investment.
Information about realized returns. After assets are liquidated at the end of period 1, man-
agers observe both their performance and the performance of their opponent.
Compensation Schemes. Managers are compensated at the end of period 2 on the basis of
their ranking. Denote Ri;t the realized return of manager t in period t, the compensation
of manager i (Ci) is as follows.
Ci = 1 if Ri;1 + Ri;2 > Rj;1 + Rj;2 (i 6= j)
Ci = 1=2 if Ri;1 + Ri;2 = Rj;1 + Rj;2 (i 6= j)
Ci = 0 otherwise
(1)
The better performing manager receives a strictly positive compensation normalized to
one and the worse performing manager gets nothing. If the two managers perform equally
well, they both receive a compensation of 1=2.
Our model captures the following idea in a simple framework. First, investors use
rankings as a rule of thumb to evaluate managers and allocate capital into funds. Second,
fund managers are risk-neutral agents who are compensated on the basis of the size of the
fund they manage. Hence, managers' objective is to outperform their opponent.
framework for tractability. Qualitatively, our results hold if we assume compounded returns. However, this latter
formulation requires more assumptions since we must de¯ne what happens if a fund realizes a negative return
in the ¯rst period. Hence, a manager must take into account in the ¯rst period the probability that he will still
have amount positive amount of money to manage in the second period and the expected return conditional on
having a positive amount to manage in the second period.
8It can be argued that investors choose some type of relative performance scheme to
evaluate money managers only if the two managers are of di®erent qualities. This may not
be the case. It is su±cient that investors believe that managers are of di®erent qualities. For
example, consider the following situation. With probability 1=2, manager i is a high quality
manager and with probability 1=2 he is a bad quality manager, and probabilities of being
a good manager are independent across managers. Moreover, the two managers observe
the realized types while investors do not. In such a situation, with probability 1=2, it is
common knowledge among managers that they are of the same type. However, investors
do not know whether managers are of the same type. According to investors' beliefs, with
probability 1=2, there is a good and a bad manager, and they uses a relative performance
rule to evaluate managers.
Here, in order to concentrate on incentives generated by di®erences in intermediate
performances, we solely study the case in which managers are of the same quality. If
managers were of di®erent qualities, incentives in period 2 would be driven by both interim
performances and di®erence in quality.
Also, we assume that returns realized by managers are uncorrelated. This implies that
the only strategic decision of the managers is the variance of their portfolio. A more com-
plete model would assume that a manager can also in°uence the covariance of his return
and that of his competitor. The possibility to in°uence the covariance of the return provides
the following type of behaviors. The best reply of an interim loser to the portfolio chosen
by the interim winner in the second period is to \di®erentiate himself" from the interim
winner. That is, in the second period, the interim loser chooses a portfolio with return un-
correlated to that of the interim winner. Conversely, the best reply of an interim winner is
to choose the same portfolio as the interim loser. Hence, when studying the strategic choice
of correlations in returns by managers, the main issue is of herding incentives generated by
ranking based objectives. Here, by concentrating on the variance as a strategic variable,
we focus on risk incentives generated by ranking objectives.
The benchmark case. We consider as a benchmark the case in which managers maximize
their expected return. In such a situation, both managers choose v = ^ v in each period.
9The goal of our model is to show how ranking objective alter the managers' investment
strategies.
4 Equilibrium investment strategies
We solve the model using backward induction. Hence, we start by deriving the equilibrium
of the game played by the two managers in period 2. Denote Rt;w and Rt;l the return
obtained in period by t by the interim winner and loser, respectively. Let ¢ = R1;w ¡R1;l.
The objective of the interim loser is to maximize Prob(R2;l > ¢+R2;w) while the objective
of the interim winner is to minimize this probability. From the assumption about the
distribution of returns, R2;l ¡ R2;w is normally distributed with mean m(vl) ¡ m(vw) and
variance vl + vw. Hence, the objective of the interim loser is to minimize
G(vw;vl;¢) =
¢ + m(vw) ¡ m(vl)
(vl + vw)1=2 (2)
over vl while the objective of the interim winner is to maximize G(vw;vl;¢) over vw.
























w;¢) > 0 (6)
We derive the following proposition
Proposition 1 Assume that managers' compensation is given by (1). If ¢ 6= 0, then
v¤
w < ^ v < v¤
l in the second period. Furthermore, v¤
w and v¤
l are decreasing and increasing in
¢, respectively. If ¢ = 0, then both managers chooses ^ v.
Proof: See Appendix.
10In the last period, an interim loser takes more risk than an interim winner, hence
(relatively) gambling for resurrection. Furthermore, when both managers have performed
equally well in the ¯rst period, they both maximize their expected return in the second
period. The reason is that if manager i chooses ^ v and manager j 6= i does not then manager
i has a probability strictly larger than 1=2 of winning the contest, while if manager j chooses
^ v, both managers have a probability 1=2 of winning the contest. Hence, when managers
have performed equally well in the ¯rst period, they both choose ^ v in the second period.
By the same argument, we derive equilibrium strategies played in the ¯rst period.
Proposition 2 In the ¯rst period, both managers choose ^ v.
Proof: From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that a manager who is leading after
the ¯rst period has a probability strictly larger than 1=2 of winning the contest. Now,
if manager 1 choose v1 = ^ v in the ¯rst period, then for any v2 6= ^ v chosen by manager
2, Prob(¢2;1 > 0) < 1=2 while if manager 2 chooses v2 6= ^ v in the ¯rst period, then
Prob(¢2;1 > 0) = 1=2. Hence, ^ v is a best reply to ^ v.2
From Propositions 1 and 2, we deduce that an interim loser increases risk in the last part
of the year while an interim winner locks in his gain, hence playing a conservative strategy.
Moreover, the loser's incentives to gamble for resurrection and the winner's incentives to
lock in the ¯rst-period relative gain are increasing in the di®erence in performance in the
¯rst period. The following proposition derives conditions on the set of possible strategies
under which the total amount of risk undertaken in the last part of the year is larger than
in the ¯rst part.
Proposition 3 If for all d > 0, jm0(^ v¡d)j ¸ jm0(^ v+d)j, then the total amount of risk in the
second period is larger than in the ¯rst period independently of ¢ (i.e., v1;2+v2;2 > v1;1+v2;1)
Proof: From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that in the period 2 subgame Nash
Equilibrium, m0(v¤
l ) = ¡m0(v¤
w). Proposition 3 follows directly. 2
11Note that the proposition holds if m(:) is symmetric with respect to ^ v, and holds inde-
pendently of the observed di®erence in performance after the ¯rst period (¢).
An extension
The model presented so far concentrates on incentives generated by ranking objectives,
i.e., funds participate in a winner-takes-all contest and do not take into account their
performance relative to some benchmark return.
We now extend the previous model to the case in which managers' compensation depends
both on their ranking and their performance relative to an exogenous benchmark. Denote
Rb;t the realized benchmark return in period t. We assume that the compensation of
manager i is as follows:
^ Ci = ®
2 X
t=1
(Ri;t ¡ Rb;t) + ¯Ci (7)
with ® > 0, ¯ > 0 and where Ci is given by (1).
If managers' compensation is given by ^ C, then it is increasing both in ranking and in
performance relative to some exogenous benchmark.
Let F be the distribution function of a random variable normally distributed with mean
zero and variance equal to one, respectively. Then, in period 2 the objective of the interim
loser is to maximize
Hl(vl;vw;¢) = ®m(vl) ¡ ¯F[G(vw;vl;¢)] (8)
(where G(vw;vl;¢) is given by (2)) while the objective of the interim winner is to maximize
Hw(vw;vl;¢) = ®m(vw) +¯F[G(vw;vl;¢)] (9)
The following proposition establishes that Propositions 1 and 2 still hold under the new
compensation scheme.
Proposition 4 Assume that managers' compensation is given by (7). Then
(i) If ¢ 6= 0, then v¤
w < ^ v < v¤
l in the second period.
(ii) In the ¯rst period, both managers choose ^ v.
12Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 4 states that the existence of a premium for being ranked ¯rst generates
risk-taking incentives in the last period for a manager not ranked ¯rst at interim stage.
5 Empirical results
The objective of this section is to test whether managers respond to ranking objectives.
Our conjecture is that, when selecting funds, investors take into account both the excess
return realized by the fund and its ranking. Therefore, managers receiving an asset based
compensation have both ranking and excess return incentives. As a function of the realized
return, the compensation C has the following shape:
Ci;t = f(Ri;t ¡ RM




t represent the return realized by fund i in year t, the market return
in year t, and the return realized by the top performer in year t, respectively, f is an
increasing function and B represents the managerial income generated by the °ow into the
fund ranked ¯rst while Ifg is the indicator function.
In such a case, after having observed the interim performance of his competitors, the
objective of manager i is to maximize
E(Ci;tjInfoint
i;t ) = E[f(Ri;t ¡ RM
t )jinfoint




i;t is the information about interim performance at interim stage.
The interim ranking performance should be positively related to the probability of the
fund being ranked ¯rst at the end of the year. It implies that the better the interim ranking
performance, the larger the weight of the ranking objective in the expected compensation.
Therefore, funds with higher interim ranking performance are expected to take relatively
more risk in the last part of the year. Our goal is to test this ranking performance-risk
relation.
135.1 Performance measures
Let Ri;t(1) and Ni;t denote fund i's return and ranking (according to its return), respectively,
in the ¯rst semester of year t. We consider the following performance measures.
² FRACi;t: Represents the fraction of funds below fund i after the ¯rst semester of year
t, i.e.,
FRACi;t = 1 ¡
Ni;t ¡ 1
Nt
where Nt is the number of the active funds in year t.












² EXCESSi;t: Return of fund i in excess of the market return (S&P500) in the ¯rst
semester of year t, i.e.,
EXCESSi;t = Ri;t(1) ¡ RM
t (1);
where RM
t (1) represents the return of the S&P500 index over the ¯rst semester of year
t.
While EXCESS represents the standard relative performance measure with respect
to an exogenous market return benchmark, FRAC and COMP are relative performance
measures with respect to a direct competitor. FRAC represents the normalized ranking
of the fund after the ¯rst semester going down from 1 for the top fund to 1
Nt for the
bottom fund. COMP takes into account both the ranking of fund i and the distribution
of performances of funds that have outperformed fund i in the ¯rst semester. COMP is
relatively large when the fund is ranked high and/or there is not much di®erence between
fund performances after the ¯rst semester. COMP is small if the fund is ranked low and/or
14performances are widely dispersed. We use COMP to capture the idea that if managers
have tournament incentives, then both their ranking and the distance to the top fund
matter.
5.2 Data
The data used in this paper come from Morningstar Incorporated. The main data source
is Morningstar Mutual Funds OnDisc of January 1995, which includes monthly returns
of US mutual funds up to December 1994. This data set contains only funds that were
still in operation as of January 1995. In order to mitigate the problem of the survivorship
bias, we also purchased from Morningstar the returns data of the funds which ceased to
exist since the beginning of 1989. Similar to Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) we restrict
our attention to growth-oriented funds. Our ¯nal sample consists of 798 growth funds
which were active in the period January 1989 through December 1994. Since we are mainly
interested in testing the impact of ranking objectives on fund choice of risk, in each year,
we restrict our attention to the funds that are above the median after the ¯rst semester.
There are two main reasons for which we concentrate on top half funds. First, almost all
these funds outperform the market return after the ¯rst semester. Hence, risk-incentives
are not driven by the willingness to catch up with the market return. Second, it seems
reasonable to assume that only these funds compete for the top end-of-the-year rankings.
5.3 Results
Following Koski and Ponti® (1999), we analyze changes in total, systematic and idiosyn-
cratic risks between the ¯rst and the second half of the year.
5.3.1 Total risk
Let Ri;m(l;t) be the return of fund i in the m-th month of the l-th semester of year t. Then
¹ Ri;t(l) =
P6
m=1 Ri;m(l;t) represents the average monthly performance of fund i over a given
semester.
We de¯ne the total risk undertaken by fund i over semester l as the standard deviation
15of fund i's monthly returns, i.e.,
STDi(l;t) =




(Ri;m(l;t) ¡ ¹ Ri(l;t))2 (10)
First, we test whether ranking objectives matter and if they are more important for top
performing funds than for others. We run the following regression:
¢STDi;t = ®1STD(1)i;t + ®2EXCESSi;t + ®3RANKi;t + (®4 + ®5RANKi;t) ¤ Dec(1)
+
P
t ±tY earDumt + "i;t
(11)
where ¢STDi;t ´ STD(2)i;t ¡ STD(1)i;t is the change in the measure of fund i's total
risk between the ¯rst and second semesters of year t, RANKi;t is one of the two ranking
measures (FRACi;t or COMPi;t), Dec(1) is a dummy equal to 1 if the fund belongs to the
top decile according to its performance in the ¯rst semester, and Y earDumt is a dummy
variable equal to 1 in year t. Following Koski and Ponti® (1999), we include the risk level
for the ¯rst semester in our regression to control for the measurement error. Since we have
a noisy measure of risk based on 6 monthly observations, we expect mean reversion in the
noise component of our estimate from the ¯rst to the second semester which should be
captured by STD(1). Note that we also include the top decile dummy in the regression
to make the intercept di®erent for the top decile and the rest of the funds. Year dummies
Y earDumt are included in order to control for the year-speci¯c e®ects.
Table 1 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors. When RANK = FRAC, results are not signi¯cant. Conversely, they
are highly signi¯cant when RANK = COMP. The di®erence of results between the two
regressions does not come as a surprise since the probability of catching up with the top
fund depends on both the interim ranking and the distance to the top fund. The variable
COMP takes both components into account while FRAC only considers the ¯rst one.
We ¯nd that ®3 and ®5 are signi¯cantly positive at the 5% level. This means that interim
ranking in°uences subsequent change in risk. Furthermoore, ®5 signi¯cantly positive means
that the in°uence of the intermediate ranking is signi¯cantly stronger for top decile funds
than for the others. In other words, ranking objectives are more important for funds with
16a top decile interim performance than for others.
To investigate the shape of the performance-risk relation in more detail when RANK =
COMP, we run a piecewise linear regression where the slope coe±cient for the ranking-
related performance measure is di®erent for each of the deciles:
¢STDi;t = ®1STD(1)i;t + ®2EXCESSi;t +
P5
j=1 (®3;j + ®4;jCOMPi;t) ¤ Dec(j)
+
P
t ±tY earDumt + "i;t
(12)
where Dec(j) is a dummy equal to 1 if the fund belongs to the j-th decile according
to its performance in the ¯rst semester. Table 2 provides the results. We ¯nd that ®2
is signi¯cantly negative at the 10% level. This is consistent with the results of Brown,
Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Koski and Ponti® (1999):
funds that have outperformed in the ¯rst part of the year the benchmark against which
they are evaluated decrease their level of risk in the last part of the year. We also ¯nd that
®4;1, ®4;3 and ®4;4 are signi¯cantly positive at the 5% level and, for all j = 2;:::;5, we
reject the hypothesis that ®4;1 = ®4;j at the 5% level. These results con¯rm those obtained
in Regression (11): ranking objectives generate risk-taking incentives and these incentives
are stronger for top funds than for others.
It can be argued that there is an alternative explanation for our results: the allocation
of money into funds is a convex function of EXCESS, hence generating a compensation
convex in EXCESS and risk incentives for managers. To test for such a possibility, we
relax the constraint that EXCESS has a linear impact on ¢STD, and assume that the
relation is decile dependent. We consider the following regressions.
¢STDi;t = ®1STD(1)i;t + ®2EXCESSi;t + ®3RANKi;t
+(®4 +®5EXCESSi;t + ®6RANKi;t) ¤ Dec(1)
+
P
t ±tY earDumt + "i;t
(13)
¢STDi;t = ®1STD(1)i;t +
P5
j=1(®2;j + ®3;jEXCESSi;t + ®4;jCOMPi;t) ¤ Dec(j)
+
P
t±tY earDumt + "i;t
(14)
17Results are given in Tables 3 and 4. For either regression, we do not ¯nd any evidence that
the impact of the excess return in the ¯rst part of the year on the change of risk level di®ers
for top performing managers and for other managers. In particular, the change of risk level
in the last part of the year does not appear to be convex in the excess return realized in
the ¯rst part of the year.
Hence, we can conclude that there is no evidence that managers' compensation is con-
vex in excess returns while there is evidence that top interim performers have strong risk
incentives generated by ranking objectives.
5.3.2 Systematic and idiosyncratic risks
In order to investigate in more details the risk taking behavior of fund managers, we de-
compose the total risk STD into systematic and idiosyncratic risks.
The systematic risk BETA is measured as the beta coe±cient in a market model re-
gression of fund return in excess of the risk-free rate on the S&P500 return in excess of the
risk free rate.
The idiosyncratic risk IDIOi;t is de¯ned as the standard deviation of the residual terms
from a market model regression of fund return in excess of the risk free rate on the S&P500
return in excess of the risk free rate:
IDIOi(l;t) =






where ei;m(l;t) is the market model residual.
For both measures of risk, we run the most detailed type of regressions, i.e.,
¢RISKi;t = ®1RISK(1)i;t +
P5
j=1(®2;j + ®3;jEXCESSi;t + ®4;jCOMPi;t) ¤ Dec(j)
+
P
t±tY earDumt + "i;t
(15)
where RISK = BETA;IDIO and ¢RISKi;t is the change in RISK of fund i between
the ¯rst and the second semester of year t.
Results for the systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk are given in Tables 5 and 6, respec-
tively. Results are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the total risk although only
18marginally signi¯cant in case of systematic risk. Conversely, the results for idiosyncratic
risk are highly signi¯cant. It implies that funds have ranking objectives which generate
mainly idiosyncratic risk-taking incentives. Furthermore, these ranking objectives are more
important for top decile funds than for others.
5.3.3 Robustness
We checked the robustness of our results in several ways. Qualitatively, our results hold
if we use the median return in the category (as Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996) or the
mean return (as Kosky and Ponti®, 1999) as benchmarks to compute excess returns. Our
results also hold if we consider di®erent splittings of the calendar year. More precisely, we
checked that our results hold if we consider the period from January to May as the ¯rst
period (and June to December as the second) or if we consider January to July as the ¯rst
period (and August to December as the second).
6 Conclusion
The nature of the competition in the money management industry generates relative perfor-
mance objectives for managers. In this paper, we have studied how ranking objectives (as in
a tournament) in°uence portfolio decision of mutual fund manager. In a two-period setting,
we have shown how interim ranking in°uences the riskiness of the investment strategy cho-
sen by managers in the last period. The interim loser increases risk while the interim winner
decreases risk. Furthermore, we have derived conditions on the set of possible strategies
under which the aggregate amount of risk undertaken in the last period is larger than in
the ¯rst period.
Then, we have provided evidence that fund managers have ranking objectives which
generate risk taking incentives and risk induced by ranking objectives takes mainly the form
of idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, ranking objectives are signi¯cantly more important for
funds with a top decile interim performance than for the others.
Finally, we can advise investors not to select mutual funds on the basis of their ranking
in performance but rather on the extent of the di®erence in performances. Such a fund
19picking strategy \linearizes" manager's incentives, hence aligning their incentives with those
of investors.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Conditions (3) and (4) are equivalent to
¢ + m(v¤
w) ¡ m(v¤



















l ) + m0(v¤
l ) < 0 (19)
respectively.
Conditions (16) and (17) imply that
m0(v¤
l ) = ¡m0(v¤
w) (20)
Hence, vl ¡ ^ v and vw ¡ ^ v are of opposite signs.
If m0(v¤
w) > 0 then m(v¤
w) > m(v¤
l ). This ensures a probability of winning the contest
strictly larger than 1=2 for the intermediate winner. Conversely, if m0(v¤
w) < 0 then m(v¤
w) <
m(v¤
l ) and the probability that the intermediate winner wins the contest is less than 1=2.
This implies that there exist a deviation v0
w such that m(v0
w) > m(v¤
l ) which ensures a
probability of winning strictly larger than 1=2. Hence, there cannot be an equilibrium with
m0(v¤) < 0. Therefore, in equilibrium v¤
w < ^ v < v¤
l . The proof that v¤
w and v¤
l are increasing
and decreasing in ¢, respectively, follows directly from m0(v¤
l ) = ¡m0(v¤
w) and the strict
concavity of m(:).
From conditions (16) and (17), we deduce that
d¢+ m0(vw)dvw ¡ m0(vl)dvl = 2(dvw + dvl)m0(vw) + 2(vw + vl)m00(vw)dvw (21)
20d¢ + m0(vw)dvw ¡m0(vl)dvl = ¡2(dvw + dvl)m0(vl) ¡ 2(vw + vl)m00(vl)dvl (22)
This implies that
m00(vw)dvw = m00(vl)dvl (23)
In turn, this implies that dvl and dvw are of opposite signs. Furthermore, from (20), (21)
and (23), we obtain that
d¢ = dvw
µ






Hence, vw and vl are decreasing and increasing in ¢, respectively. 2
Proof of proposition 4:
Proof of (i). From (8), we deduce that the FOC of compensation maximization for the
interim loser is
®m0(vl) + ¯f[G(vw;vl;¢)]
2(vw + vl)m0(vl) + ¢ + m(vw) ¡m(vl)
2(vw + vl)3=2
= 0 (25)
and from (9), we deduce that the FOC of compensation maximization for the interim winner
is
®m0(vw) +¯f[G(vw;vl;¢)]
2(vw +vl)m0(vw) ¡(¢ + m(vw) ¡ m(vl))
2(vw + vl)3=2
= 0 (26)














Given that m(:) is strictly concave, (27) implies that, in equilibrium, m0(vl) and m0(vw)
are of opposite signs. Assume that m0(vl) > 0 > m0(vw). From (25), this implies that
¢ + m(vw) ¡ m(vl) < 0. However, in such a case the LHS of (26) is strictly negative.
Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, in equilibrium, m0(vl) < 0 < m0(vw)
which implies that vw < ^ v < vl.
Proof of (ii). Identical to the proof of Proposition 2. 2
21Table 1: OLS Regression for Changes in total risk within a year (¢STD) as a
function of interim performance. Note: heteroscedasticity-consistent (White) standard
errors are reported in parentheses; ¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.







RANK ¤ Dec(1) 0.020 1.976**
(0.024) (0.929)
R2 0.325 0.328
22Table 2: OLS Regression for Changes in total risk within a year (¢STD) as a
function of interim performance with RANK = COMP. Note: heteroscedasticity-
consistent (White) standard errors are reported in parentheses; ¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate
signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The last four columns present
F-statistics on a test of di®erences: ®4;i = ®4;j (i = 1;:::;4; j = i + 1;:::;5).





RANK ¤ Dec(1) 3.281***
(1.184)
RANK ¤ Dec(2) 0.744* 6.36**
(0.420)
RANK ¤ Dec(3) 0.906*** 5.41** 0.25
(0.317)
RANK ¤ Dec(4) 0.868*** 5.50** 0.17 0.03
(0.251)
RANK ¤ Dec(5) 0.479** 7.16*** 0.68 3.56* 5.46**
(0.232)
R2 0.333
23Table 3: OLS Regression for Changes in total risk within a year (¢STD) as a
function of interim performance. Note: heteroscedasticity-consistent (White) standard
errors are reported in parentheses; ¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.









RANK ¤ Dec(1) 0.025 1.865*
(0.025) (0.967)
R2 0.326 0.328
24Table 4: OLS Regression for Changes in total risk within a year (¢STD) as a
function of interim performance with RANK = COMP. Note: heteroscedasticity-
consistent (White) standard errors are reported in parentheses; ¤ ¤ ¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate
signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The last four columns present F-
statistics on a test of di®erences: ®3;i = ®3;j and ®4;i = ®4;j (i = 1;:::;4; j = i +1;:::;5).
coe±cient F(decile 1) F(decile 2) F(decile 3) F(decile 4)
STD(1) -0.557***
(0.032)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(1) -0.108**
(0.046)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(2) -0.099 0.08
(0.065)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(3) -0.119 0.05 0.19
(0.078)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(4) -0.121 0.06 0.23 0.00
(0.080)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(5) -0.065 0.60 0.42 0.91 1.11
(0.083)
RANK ¤ Dec(1) 3.137**
(1.342)
RANK ¤ Dec(2) 0.709 4.99**
(0.486)
RANK ¤ Dec(3) 0.808** 4.20** 0.07
(0.366)
RANK ¤ Dec(4) 0.801*** 4.19** 0.07 0.00
(0.293)
RANK ¤ Dec(5) 0.486* 5.25** 0.40 1.62 3.22*
(0.276)
R2 0.334
25Table 5: OLS Regression for Changes in systematic risk within a year (¢BETA)
as a function of interim performance with RANK = COMP. Note: heteroscedasticity-
consistent (White) standard errors are reported in parentheses; ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate signif-
icance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The last four columns present F-statistics
on a test of di®erences: ®3;i = ®3;j and ®4;i = ®4;j (i = 1;:::;4; j = i + 1;:::;5).
Coe±cient F(decile 1) F(decile 2) F(decile 3) F(decile 4)
BETA(1) -0.775***
(0.038)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(1) -1.468
(1.453)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(2) -2.118 0.49
(2.065)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(3) -1.371 0.00 0.37
(2.491)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(4) -2.513 0.47 0.09 0.63
(2.622)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(5) -1.195 0.03 0.46 0.01 0.85
(2.663)
RANK ¤ Dec(1) 69.610*
(40.346)
RANK ¤ Dec(2) 7.655 3.84**
(15.218)
RANK ¤ Dec(3) 16.581 2.51 0.63
(11.841)
RANK ¤ Dec(4) 18.449* 2.31 1.12 0.05
(9.534)
RANK ¤ Dec(5) 9.824 3.11* 0.04 0.72 2.41
(9.083)
R2 0.616
26Table 6: OLS Regression for Changes in unsystematic risk within a year (¢IDIO)
as a function of interim performance with RANK = COMP. Note: heteroscedasticity-
consistent (White) standard errors are reported in parentheses; ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate signif-
icance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The last four columns present F-statistics
on a test of di®erences: ®3;i = ®3;j and ®4;i = ®4;j (i = 1;:::;4; j = i + 1;:::;5).
Coe±cient F(decile 1) F(decile 2) F(decile 3) F(decile 4)
IDIO(1) -0.586***
(0.028)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(1) -0.129***
(0.039)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(2) -0.143** 0.25
(0.056)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(3) -0.137** 0.04 0.03
(0.036)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(4) -0.125* 0.01 0.20 0.07
(0.070)
EXCESS ¤ Dec(5) -0.103 0.45 1.23 0.70 0.27
(0.068)
RANK ¤ Dec(1) 4.203***
(1.027)
RANK ¤ Dec(2) 1.028** 16.29***
(0.420)
RANK ¤ Dec(3) 0.996*** 14.11*** 0.01
(0.342)
RANK ¤ Dec(4) 0.579** 18.23*** 2.32 2.65
(0.268)
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